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Dale Jamieson's article raises the ethical challenges facing humankind in
relation to global climate change.' His thought-provoking analysis also raises
the need to confront other ethical challenges facing public health in the global
era. This article focuses on the current controversies surrounding bioethics,
and concentrates on how the Council of Europe's Bioethics Convention,
adopted in November 1996 and signed in April 1997, handles these ethical
controversies.' While global climate change and destruction of ecosystems
may have adverse impacts on the world's genetic resources, human
manipulation of genes generates many different ethical concerns that people
approach with often fundamentally opposite perspectives. The Bioethics
Convention provides an excellent case study of the ethical difficulties states
and peoples will face in coming to grips with the moral implications of the
advances in scientific technologies.
Generally, bioethics concerns the reasoned comments and evaluation of
human interventions of all kinds into life processes, be they plant, animal, or
human. Bioethics does not consist of a school of ethics, or even of special
rules and principles for physicians and biologists. Bioethics combines ethical
questions relevant to interventions into life processes of all kinds. Thus, it
embraces the classical categories of biomedical ethics, animal ethics, and
environmental ethics, but also ethical questions relating to gene technology.
The recent successful cloning of Dolly the sheep in Scotland in 1997 brought
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many bioethical issues to the surface and provides a good example of the
comprehensive moral challenge genetic engineering poses. Naturally, all these
ethical dimensions cannot be discussed in a brief comment, nor for that matter
within the context of the Bioethics Convention itself. Instead, I will focus my
comment on human gene technology and reproductive medicine.
I. ETHICAL BACKGROUND TO THE BIOETHICS CONVENTION
More than ten years of intensive debate by experts preceded the adoption
and signing of the Bioethics Convention, which illustrates how controversial
this topic has become. In this section, the two fundamentally conflicting views
that provide the context for the negotiations of the Bioethics Convention are
briefly outlined.
From the outset of the debate about the negotiation of the Bioethics
Convention, states divided into two camps: the conservative or fundamentalist
position; and the gradualist or liberal position. Conservatives followed the
lines propounded by philosophers like Hans Jonas, who pleaded that the
application of gene technology to human embryos or germ cells be forbidden.
Lax ethical standards, in connection with human gene technology, would cause
a moral dike to break. Jonas argued as follows:
Modem technology has produced new capabilities of such
magnitude, with such novel objects and novel consequences,
that the framework of earlier ethics no longer fits. The
Antigone Choir about the horrific, about the stupendous
might of humankind today would have to be reformulated
... we will have to re-learn reverence and shuddering, to
protect us from the aberrations of our own might, such as
from experiments with the human constitution. The paradox
of our situation consists in that we will have to regain lost
reverence from shuddering, the positive from the imagined
negative: reverence for what human beings were and are, and
shuddering from what they might turn into and might stare at
us from an anticipated future?
3. HANS JONAS, THE IMPERATIVE OF RESPONSIBILITY 11 (12th ed. 1995). For an overview, see also
Eibe Riedel. Gentechnologie und Embryonefschutz als Vernassungs - und Regelungs Problem, in 13
EUROPAISCHE GRUNDRECHTE-ZEITSCHRIFr 469 (1986).
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Many Europeans, and particularly Germans, accepted Jonas' emotional
arguments against human gene technology. According to this view, reverence
for the image of man would represent the core principle of moral
responsibility.
The gradualist, or liberal, counterposition starts from the premise that
human beings have changed and from the beginning have altered their
surrounding environment in order to secure survival, subsistence, or a better
way of life. Every technological innovation-from the invention of flint as a
tool or weapon to the atom bomb and peaceful uses of nuclear
energy-brought with it chances and risks. The negative side of technology
should be reckoned with, but it should not be allowed to cut off possibilities
to use new technologies for human betterment.
This brief description of the conservative and liberal positions illustrates
the ethical divide into which the negotiations for the Bioethics Convention
ventured. Conservatives focused attention on the negative potential of human
gene technology, saying that it could ultimately and adversely change the
genetic heritage of humankind by irreversibly altering the gene pool. One
such negative is the potential for pathogens to emerge or reemerge that prey
on a more susceptible human gene pool. Moreover, our conception of the
human being might be affected in the core areas of personal identity if
embryonic or human germ cell genetic engineering were allowed or cell
cloning on human beings became a real possibility. Liberals or gradualists
stressed that genetic engineering and fertilization, in the context of
reproductive medicine, still concern different fields that in practice are
separated, and from an ethical standpoint, might be viewed differently. The
most recent advances in microbiology, particularly soma cell reproduction in
animals, make it probable, however, that the convenient distinction between
gene technology and biomedicine found in the books will no longer be
sustainable.
The ethical divide between the conservative and liberal outlooks on human
gene technology beset the negotiators of the Bioethics Convention from the
very beginning of the process. In addition, national legislative realities and the
processes of globalization factored into the equation. Most Western European
states have fairly liberal laws on human gene technology; only in Germany and
in some southern European countries do the laws reflect a more rigorous
ethical position. The German national position induced German
pharmaceutical and biochemical firms to invest in countries with more
1997]
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favorable climates for human gene technology, thus illustrating that
globalization plays a role in coming to grips with bioethical concerns. As a
Canadian colleague once said to me: "You Germans provide the morals and
we do the business."
Against this background of liberal gene technology in Britain, France,
Belgium, and other European states, the Bioethics Convention had to strike a
balance that probably cannot be found. If the treaty provisions were too
liberal, Germany would not ratify. If the provisions were framed too strictly,
Britain and other science-oriented states would not ratify. As so often happens
in international relations, formal compromises eventually were devised, where
the stark differences of opinion were glossed over by recourse to abstract
clauses, open to different interpretation. Yet the Bioethics Convention tried
to establish a general setting, by presenting itself as a framework treaty, where
only a few concordant principles are laid down, while specific and
sanctionable rules are left for future protocols to be negotiated at a later stage.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE BIOETHICS CONVENTION
The Bioethics Convention began by relating bioethics with the human
rights approach of the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms of 1950 (ECHR)4 in an attempt to tie in the inherent
value of the human being into the bioethics debate. While the ECHR focuses
on the human being and his/her dignity in the context of a holistic personality-
identity framework, the Bioethics Convention enlarges this concept by
extending respect to human substances capable of human protection. The
Bioethics Convention excludes animal and plant biology. In effect, the
Bioethics Convention covers all medical and biological applications
concerning human beings, including preventive, diagnostic, therapeutic, and
research applications.
Article 1(2) of the Convention mandates that each party give effect to its
provisions in its internal law. It is formulated in such a way that it amounts to
a non-self-executing obligation. However, some articles are framed in such a
way that they may be regarded as self-executing and can thus be applied
directly at the domestic level. This applies in particular to those provisions of
the Convention that formulate individual rights, such as the rights of data
4. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR].
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protection, as stipulated in Article 10.' Article 2 stresses the primacy of the
human being and that the welfare interests of the human being shall prevail
over the sole interest of society or science.' The word "sole" was the
compromise formula by which the negotiators sought to muster the consent of
those wishing to restrict bioethical research altogether. Research, thus, is
allowed, but only under conditions stated in Articles 15-18." Articles 3 and 4
lay down non-self-executing obligations regarding equitable access to health
care and define professional standards.' "Health care" means the services
offering diagnostic, preventive, therapeutic, and rehabilitative interventions,
all geared to alleviate a person's suffering or maintaining or improving a
person's state of health.' Continuous quality assessment is a prerequisite for
health care, as the Explanatory Report to the Convention points out.'0 The
term "intervention" as used throughout the text means all medical acts
performed for the purpose of preventive care, diagnosis, treatment, or
rehabilitation measures, or in a research context." The Convention then
focuses on six major problems:
(1) questions of consent to interventions in the health field,'
(2) protection of the human genome and scientific research, 3
(3) research on embryos,
4
(4) transplantation medicine,'"
(5) data protection issues,6 and
(6) economic consequences of biogenetics.'
With regard to the consent question, the Convention glossed over the
underlying controversies and now provides that medical research may not be
carried out on persons not able to consent unless: it is for their own immediate
5. Bioethics Convention, supra note 2, at art. 10.
6. Id. at art. 2.
7. Id. atarts. 15-18.
8. Id. at arts. 3-4.
9. Id
10. Explanatory Report to the Convention for the Protection of the Human Being with Regard to the
Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, Apr. 4, 1997, 36
I.L.M. 826, 829 [hereinafter Explanatory Report to the Bioethics Convention].
11. See id
12. Bioethics Convention, supra note 2, at arts. 5-9.
13. Id at arts. I-I18.
14. Id. at art. 18.
15. Id. at arts. 19-20.
16. Id. at art. 10.
17. Id. at arts. 21-22.
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benefit," or under the restrictive exception that no other alternatives of
comparable effectiveness to research on humans are available; 9 a careful risk-
benefit assessment for the individual concerned is carried out as a
prerequisite; 0 an independent examination (usually by ethics commissions)
relating to its scientific merit and multidisciplinary review of its ethical
acceptability has been carried out; ' and that "the persons undergoing research
have been informed of their rights and the safeguards prescribed by law for
their protection."
The most disputed clause of the Convention concerns the acceptability of
embryo research. Article 18 states:
1. Where the law allows research on embryos in vitro, it
shall ensure adequate protection of the embryo.
2. The creation of human embryos for research purposes is
prohibited.'
Originally, embryo research was to be allowed until nidation, or the fourteenth
day after conception, if allowed by national legislation. Germany passed the
Embryo Protection Act in 1990, which categorically forbade any genetic
interference with human germ cells. Most other European states saw no need
for such a comprehensive ban; or, if they did enact specific prohibitions, they
allowed generous exceptions for research purposes, without even requiring a
nexus with prophylactic, diagnostic, or therapeutic purposes. The final version
of the embryo research clause in Article 18 attempted to hide this conflict. It
is up to the state concerned to define what is meant by "adequate protection of
the embryo,"4 and thus Article 18.1 is quite unacceptable to many
conservatives. Even Article 18.2, providing that "the creation of human
embryos for research purposes is prohibited," does not allay qualms about the
18. Id. at art. 6(1).
19. Id at art. 17(IXiii).
20. Id at art. 17(2) (referring to art. 16 (i, iii, iv, and v) and requiring additional assessments). Article
17(2Xi)provides: "the research has the aim of contributing, through significant improvement in the scientific
understanding of the individual's condition, disease or disorder, to the ultimate attainment of results capable
of conferring benefit to the person concerned . I..." ld. Article 17 (2) (ii) provides: "the research entails
only minimal risk and minimal burden for the individual concerned." Id.
21. Id. at art. 16(iii).
22. Id. at art. 16(iv).
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protection value of this prohibition. Where human embryos stored for in vitro
fertilization purposes are used for diagnosis, by analyzing and thereby
destroying one embryo cell, before others are implanted in vitro, it cannot be
said that these embryos have been created solely for gene technology research
purposes. Consequently, liberal gene technology practice remains possible, if
national legislation does not put a stop to it. The formula compromise
contained in Article 18 on embryo research is mitigated for countries like
Germany by the "wider protection clause" of Article 27, which stipulates:
"None of the provisions of this Convention shall be interpreted as limiting or
otherwise affecting the possibility for a Party to grant a wider measure of
protection with regard to the application of biology and medicine than is
stipulated in this Convention." 6 This "better law approach" is a technique
often tried in environmental law in the European Community," in the ECHR,
or in other human rights treaties."
As far as genome analysis is concerned,29 basically three types of problems
have to be distinguished: (a) pre-implantation diagnostics; (b) perinatal
diagnosis; and (c) postnatal genome analysis. Pre-implantation diagnostics is
concerned with the proof of certain inheritable traits or of the sex of human
embryos, procured for in in vitro fertilization. Research on "excess embryos"
opens up the possibility for comprehensive genetic changes. For example, it
makes positive and negative eugenics possible. Negative eugenics involves
selecting which embryos should not be implanted because they bear inheritable
diseases. Positive eugenics is the accelerated breeding of "genetically more
valuable human beings," by developing each cell of a morula cell cluster-a
six to twelve cell partition-into a genetically identical individual, into twins,
or clones. Basically, the genetic pool is thereby not touched or changed, only
a new quantitative dimension is reached. The Bioethics Convention does not
outlaw such experiments. The German Embryo Protection Act of 1990 tried
to prohibit such experiments, but it remains to be seen whether that will work
in the future, particularly as artificially managed soma cell reproduction in
higher animals becomes a real possibility. That Germans should be
particularly engaged in this issue is understandable, bearing in mind Nazi
26. Id at art. 27.
27. European Community Treaty, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 100(aXiv), 298 U.N.T.S. 3, 54.
28. ECHR, supra note 4, at arts. 17, 60.
29. Bioethics Convention, supra note 2, at arts. 11-14, 18.
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experiments in concentration camps and the gross abuses of medical ethics
during the Nazi era.
However, the sensibility of a total ban on all gene technology concerning
human beings may be questionable. At least critics ought to know about the
medical treatment and economic potential in gene technology before ruling it
out. The public debate in Germany for many years only focused on risk
assessments but hardly at all on the positive prospects of these new
technologies. It seems that fundamentalists have won the day and that the
scientific research community has moved abroad to where better science
conditions prevail. Globalization gave the German scientific and research
communities an outlet for further exploration of the potential of human gene
technology, and at the same time undermined the German national prohibition
on pre-implantation diagnostics.
The Bioethics Convention, at any rate, does not resolve the issue one way
or the other, nor could this be expected. It leaves vital questions to be resolved
either in subsequent protocols or leaves it up to national laws to determine the
scope and extent of gene technology and bioethics. This makes a mockery of
the attempt by the Council of Europe to set common standards through treaties.
Typically, Council of Europe conventions have the object not of creating
completely new codified law, but of harmonizing the differences existing in
the various European legal systems. While in effect, the Bioethics Convention
produced little consensus on this issue, it did however, raise the level of
consciousness and awareness of ethical dimensions to these new technologies.
As far as perinatal diagnosis is concerned, the Convention provides a
relatively clear answer. Article 12 states:
Tests which are predictive of genetic diseases or which serve
either to identify the subject as a carrier of a gene responsible
for a disease or to detect a genetic predisposition or
susceptibility to a disease may be performed only for health
purposes or for scientific research linked to health purposes,
and subject to appropriate genetic counselling.0
Article 14 continues by strictly outlawing selection on the basis of sex, except
where serious hereditary sex-related diseases are to be avoided. Ethically,
perinatal diagnosis can be justified on at least four grounds: (1) in order to
30. Id. at art. 12.
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calm down worried parents with late first child expectancy; (2) in order to
inform at-risk patients who previously had to live in fear until birth whether
a genetically caused deformity existed; (3) to prepare parents for an expected
sick or handicapped child; and (4) to develop therapies, for example, in cases
of early detection of treatable mucoviscidosis. In 1987, the Roman Catholic
Church strictly laid down the instruction "donum vitae", that the perinatal
diagnosis is only permitted if it "respects the life and integrity of the embryo
and is geared towards its individual protection and healing intention."',
Postnatal genome analyses seem to be ruled out by Article 12 if they
concern genome analysis on employees or for insurance purposes. 2 Postnatal
genome analysis for health protection purposes raises many difficult questions,
many of which are beyond the scope of this brief article. Paramount among
these questions is the protection of privacy rights of individuals. Presumably,
a special protocol will have to deal with the problem of privacy rights in
connection with postnatal genome analysis. The general philosophy behind
the Bioethics Convention as a framework treaty is that the right to know or not
to know embraces the human right of informational self-determination, and
thus precludes ulterior motives and purposes for genome analysis. Biological
and genetic monitoring or screening is generally viewed with great skepticism
in Europe, while industrial firms seek to utilize biological and genetic
monitoring, especially in high-risk technologies. The Convention, by contrast,
is liberal in relation to genetic fingerprints and other uses for the benefit of
society as a whole, such as criminal law detection, public health issues, or
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.3
Article 10 of the Convention addresses the problems of privacy and the
right to information or "informational self-determination," as it is called in
German jurisprudence:
(1) Everyone has the right to respect for private life in
relation to information about his or her health.
(2) Everyone is entitled to know any information collected
about his or her health. However, the wishes of
individuals not to be so informed shall be observed.
31. 74 SEKRETARIAT DER DEUTSCHEN BISCHOFSKONFERENZ 15 (1987) (citing ECCLESIA CATHOLICA,
CONGREGATIO PRO DOCTRINA FIDE1, DONUM VrrAE (1987)).
32. Bioethics Convention, supra note 2, at art. 12.
33. Id. at art. 26.
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(3) In exceptional cases, restrictions may be placed by law on
the exercise of the rights contained in paragraph 2 in the
interests of the patient.'
Article IQ thus establishes a right to privacy of information in the health
sector, reiterating the principle laid down in Article 8 of the ECHR and the
European Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to
Automatic Processing of Personal Data." The right to know or not to know
is, however, subject to restrictions under Article 26.1 of the Bioethics
Convention, which are, in fact, narrower than those contained in Articles 8
through 11 of the ECHR. Thus, a judicial authority may order a test to be
carried out on persons suspected of committing a crime, or to determine
whether a filiation link exists. The wording of Article 10 leaves doubts as to
the precise scope of the provision. Presumably, much will depend on
domestic law. A doctor, when faced with the problem of whether to inform a
patient who really does not wish to be informed, but in the interest of others
thinks it necessary to do so, will have to rely on domestic law whether he
should inform. Article 26.1 of the Convention may be cited as well, in that the
possibility for prevention of risks to third parties might warrant that the
privacy right is valued less than the risk prevention right of third persons. The
Explanatory Report is vague about this solution, and refers the problem back
to domestic law. 6 Such intrinsic vagueness and uncertainty will not promote
quick ratification of the Convention.
Economic utilization of biomedical findings is addressed in the Bioethics
Convention as well, but merely in general terms. Article 21 stresses that "the
human body and its parts shall not, as such, give rise to financial gain."37 This,
again, can be read narrowly or widely. Under a narrow construction, patents
on human substances are prohibited. On a wider reading-which seems to
underlie the Article-human substances are not to be made the issue of patents
and the like, but all technological processes that produce change in human
substances remain marketable and, therefore, open to patents. This view, in
my opinion, will ultimately prevail. I cannot see a "public domain" situation
34. Id. at art. 10.
35. Explanatory Report to the European Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to
Automatic Processing of Personal Data, Sept. 12, 1981, 1i I.L.M. 342.
36. Explanatory Report to the Bioethics Convention, supra note 10, at 31.
37. Bioethics Convention, supra note 2, at art. 21.
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gaining ground here, even if ethical responsibility criteria supported this
position.
CONCLUSION
The Bioethics Convention attempts to address a pressing question of moral
responsibility toward others, or social responsibility. Jamieson's "prevent
harm paradigm"38 neatly captures the nature of the social responsibility states
and nations face in connection with human gene technology. I agree with
Jamieson that those who are in a position to prevent anthropogenic health
problems have a strong moral obligation to prevent them and that this
responsibility extends to helping those most vulnerable to the problems already
existing and looming on the horizon. While dealing with climate change
requires a macroscopic perspective on moral responsibilities, the Bioethics
Convention addresses an ethical question from a microscopic angle-human
manipulation of the human genome. The global implications of the bioethics
controversy are not, however, microscopic because they portend potential
changes in the human genetic pool that could have foreseeable and
unforeseeable adverse consequences for the human race.
However, I do not think that the European Bioethics Convention will fulfil
the hopes of the framers of that treaty. The harmonization goal will not, in the
short or medium term, be met. In addition, it is not a good sign that the
European Parliament, after heated debates, could not agree on a joint text, let
alone a directive or recommendation on the Bioethics Convention. The
utilization of the framework convention method, while attracting more and
more diplomatic support, seems in the bioethics context ill-judged: laying
down general and generic principles first, to which all can agree, while leaving
the specific and often costly details to later protocols, only works when there
is substantial consent about the underlying main principles. Fundamental
dissent on substantive issues, as in the Bioethics Convention, cripples the
harmonization goals of such treaties, and subsequent reference back to
domestic law merely indicates that the desired consent does not exist. So it
seems doubtful that the Convention will be in force quickly, and equally
doubtful that more detailed protocols might be forthcoming rapidly.
Sovereignty still reigns strongly. However, in the light of increasing global
challenges,-we will have to work out global responsibility strategies and
38. Jamieson, supra note ],at 117.
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develop public interest norms that transcend the classical notion of state
sovereignty; these public interest norms open up like an umbrella above states.
In international environmental law ever since the Earth Summit of Rio in 1992,
we have witnessed the emergence of such global norms of responsibility, such
as sustainable eco-development, the right to development, and other notions
of intergenerational equity. 9 All are geared toward Jamieson's prevent-harm
paradigm, the responsibility to those in need. Perhaps the Bioethics
Convention is the first frustrating step in the needed effort to develop global
public interest norms in the area of bioethics.
39. Eibe Riedel, International Environmental Law. A Law to Serve the Public Interest?, in NEW
TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING - INTERNATIONAL "LEGISLATION" IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST, 61
(Jost Delbrfick ed., 1997).
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